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Cooperation on Export Control Between the United
States and Europe: A Cradle of Conflict in
Technology Transfer?
Robert van den Hoven van Genderen*
A state has [legislative]jurisdiction if its contact with a given set offacts is so
close, so substantial, so direct, so weighty, that legislation in respect of them is
in harmony with international law and its various aspects (including the prac-
tise of states, the principle of non-interference and reciprocity of the demand of
interdependence). A mere political, economic, commercial or social interest does
not in itself constitute a sufficient connection ....
I. Introduction
Information 2 and information technology3 are vital parts of eco-
nomic, strategic, and administrative functions of the modern nation.
Consequently, nations strive to control and to protect this informa-
tion. One way in which nations safeguard information is through im-
port and export laws. Although these laws may serve other
important national objectives such as protecting economic indepen-
dence and the privacy of citizens, their main thrust is preservation of
national security and sovereign independence. Many nations that
lack information technology must rely on international law to ensure
the free flow of information across national borders.4 Other technol-
ogy-rich nations support a national and international policy of with-
* Mr. van den Hoven van Genderen received a degree in International Law from the
University of Amsterdam. He then worked in the department of technology policy in the
Netherlands State Department of Economic Affairs. He is currently a member of the law
faculty at the University of Utrecht in the Netherlands. Mr. van den Hoven van Genderen
lectures on international institutional law, computer law, and telecommunications law.
I Mann, The Doctrine of Jurisdiction in International Law, 1964 Recuile des Cours 49
(cited in the Dutch Parliamentary White Papers concerning the Khan case. Tweede Kamer,
1984-85, 16082, nr. 10, p. 9).
2 The term "information" as used in this Article means any data, either alone or
combined with other data and either before or after processing activities, that results in an
addition to intelligence.
3 The term "information technology" as used in this Article means technology that
generates, transports, accumulates, or processes information electronically, electromag-
netically, or optically.
4 These nations base their demand on a variety of legal principles such as the liberal-
ization of services in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature, Oct.
30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-Il , T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 (GAIT), or the New Interna-
tional Economic Order, UNITED NATIONS, Declaration on the Establishment of a New Interna-
tional Economic Order, General Assembly Resolution 3201 (S-VI), May 1, 1974, and UNITED
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holding information and information technology from other
nations. 5 Some nations emphasize trade policies while others em-
phasize national security goals.
These different approaches make it difficult for nations with sim-
ilar security interests to harmonize their export policies. In particu-
lar, these conflicting approaches have created problems for the
Consultative Group and Coordinating Committee for Multilateral
Export Controls (CoCom or the Committee), 6 a group of Western
nations who joined together after World War II to create a unified
policy for the export of sensitive technology and information to non-
Western nations. Because CoCom depends solely on the voluntary
compliance of the participating nations, it is effective only if each
member believes that CoCom's policies are in its own best interest.
Each CoCom nation implements policy in different ways. Substantial
differences often exist between the multilateral export policy of
CoCom and the unilateral legal actions of the various CoCom mem-
bers. Specifically, the U.S. export laws, as set forth in the Export
Administration Act, 7 are security oriented and are often applied ex-
traterritorially, while the European laws are more oriented to eco-
nomic concerns. This Article analyzes the current effectiveness of
CoCom in light of the differing approaches taken by the United
States and Europe.
II. Historical Background of Technology Export Control
After World War II the euphoric state of cooperation in East-
West relations quickly gave way to a more restrained pragmatism.
Because of the increasing tension between East and West, NATO
countries developed a policy to withhold strategic goods from com-
munist countries.8 As the Cold War expanded, the fear of both in-
tended and unintended transfer of strategically sensitive knowledge
and products increased. As early as 1947, the United States imple-
mented a strategic embargo on East-West trade through the Foreign
NATIONS, Programme of Action on the Establishment ofa New International Economic Order, Gen-
eral Assembly Resolution 3202 (S-VI), May 1, 1974.
5 The transfer of control over information from citizens to their government is an-
other very sensitive issue. It is also a sensitive matter for a government to delegate these
powers through an international agreement.
6 See infra notes 1 1-12 and accompanying text.
7 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2420 (1982 & Supp. IV 1987). This Article does not spe-
cifically discuss U.S. laws governing the export of narcotics and dangerous drugs, nuclear
equipment and materials, watercraft, natural gas and electricity, or patent applications.
This Article also does not discuss the Trading with the Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-44
(1982 & Supp. V 1987), the Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 2751-2796c (1982 &
Supp. V 1987), or the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-
1706 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
8 See Berman & Carson, United States Export Controls-Past, Present and Future, 67
COLUM. L. REV. 791, 792-93 (1967).
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Assistance Act. 9 This Act required countries receiving economic and
military aid from the United States to follow the U.S. embargo pol-
icy. These countries accepted the U.S. embargo conditions mainly
because the future Alliance depended on U.S. economic and military
aid. Officially, most commercial shipments to Europe after March 1,
1948 needed export licenses, although the controls were not strictly
enforced in the early post-war period.' 0
The political atmosphere between East and West further deteri-
orated with the first Berlin crisis, the first Soviet nuclear explosion,
and the Soviet-backed triumph of Mao-Tse Tung in China. The per-
ceived military threat from Eastern European communism led to
greater military and economic countermeasures by the Alliance. On
November 22, 1949, the United States secretly initiated the forma-
tion of CoCom as one such countermeasure.'I CoCom was primar-
ily the result of the establishment of a bipolar international political
system.' 2 Even in 1949, CoCom members understood the strategic
importance to NATO security of technology and information.' 3
These initial efforts at export control strongly influenced modern
day laws and regulations governing the export of strategic
information.
9 Pub. L. No. 472, 62 Stat. 137 (1948) (codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 286b(a), 1404(a),
1404(b), 1409, 1410, 1411, & 1503 (Supp. V 1952)).
10 Berman & Garson, supra, note 8, at 796.
1 1 CoCom was formed in the same year that NATO was established. CoCom began
operation on Jan. 1, 1950, when representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom,
France, Italy, and the Benelux countries convened for the first time. Later that same year,
Norway, Denmark, Canada, and West Germany became members; Portugal and Japan fol-
lowed in 1952; Greece and Turkey in 1953; and Spain joined in 1985 after long hesitation.
In Sept. 1952 a special committee for China, named ChinCom, was created. The activities
of this committee were directed towards maintaining an embargo against China because of
the Korean War. The members of this committee were the same as CoCom. ChinCom
was abandoned in 1958. See generally G. HUFBAER &J. SCHOTr, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RE-
CONSIDERED: HISTORY AND CURRENT POLICY (1985).
12 One commentator believes that five events caused the Alliance to establish
CoCom: (1) the birth of the People's Republic of China, (2) the blockade of Berlin from
June 1948 to May 1949, (3) the use of economic warfare by Stalin on Yugoslavia after the
separation by Tito, (4) the first Soviet nuclear explosion in the autumn of 1949, (5) the
U.S. experience in using economic warfare against Japan and Germany during World War
II. See Dirksen, De Strijd Tussen CoCom en KGB-Directoraat T, INTERNATIONALE SPECTATOR,
Oct. 1986, at 613-18. See also G. ADLER-KARLSSON, WESTERN ECONOMIC WARFARE: 1947-
1967 50 (1968).
The use of economic warfare is one important aspect of a general strategy and power
policy designed to reach certain goals or to satisfy certain interests. The aforementioned
events demanded both military and economic countermeasures. CoCom probably would
not have been established without the parallel establishment of NATO or a comparable
alliance.
13 This idea has been reaffirmed in recent years by the Defence Planning Committee
(DPC). On May 22, 1986, the DPC endorsed an expanded role for conventional military
forces through the continued and cost-effective exploitation of emerging technologies.
Defence Planning Committee Communique, NATO REVIEW, June 1986, at 30.
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III. The Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls
CoCom does not exist as a formal entity but is nevertheless very
influential. Its legal basis is simply a gentleman's agreement.' The
purpose of CoCom is to coordinate a policy to restrict the export of
products and information of strategic importance to the Soviet
Union, Hungary, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, East Germany,
Romania, Albania, North Korea, Mongolia, Vietnam, and the Peo-
ple's Republic of China.' 5 CoCom consists of representatives from
Japan and all NATO members except for Iceland.
A. Institutional Structure
Although CoCom has no formal structure, it resembles the
structure of international intergovernmental organizations in gen-
eral. The organization, located in an annex of the U.S. Embassy in
Paris, 16 consists of a permanent secretariat of thirty people and three
policy layers. The lowest administrative layer is the regulating com-
mittee which is an almost permanent session of lower to middle rank-
ing diplomats from different member nations. These diplomats
perform everyday work such as drafting technology lists and coordi-
nating technical problems. The middle layer, the Executive Commit-
tee, consists of higher level government representatives who
convene twice each year. These officials decide on content-related
issues, review and adjust the dual-purpose technology control list, 17
and harmonize export regulations. In addition, the Executive Com-
mittee acts as an intermediary between CoCom, national politics,
and technical interest groups. 18 These two layers form the basic
working component of CoCom. The highest layer, the supreme pol-
icy body, consists of high level government officials such as the Di-
rectors General on external economic relations. 19 They meet once
each year to translate political decisions on licensing rules into direc-
tives for the lower levels.
B. Function
Because CoCom is neither an official body within NATO nor an
independent international organization recognizable under interna-
14 There is no evidence of a written agreement underlying CoCom. OFFICE OF TECH-
NOLOGY ASSESSMENT, TECHNOLOGY AND EAST-WEST TRADE 153 (1979).
15 Hunt, CoCom and Other International Cooperation in Export Control, in COPING WITH U.S.
EXPORT CONTROLS: 1989 70-71 (1989).
16 Even though the French have left NATO, the Committee is based in Paris and not
in Brussels as one might expect. The reason is a quirk of history. Both CoCom and the
OECD evolved from the Marshall Plan which had its headquarters in Paris.
17 See infra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
18 Because the Executive Committee has a strategic function, a mutually acceptable
chairman is necessary.
19 The different Departments of Defense also influence export policy although na-
tional governments deny this influence.
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tional law, its decisions are not formally binding on members. In
practice, however, members generally follow the unanimous deci-
sions of the Committee by adjusting their applicable national export
laws. 20 In this sense, Committee policy determines national law in a
very direct way. The decisions are essentially dictated by this infor-
mal policy-making committee without even a two-way flow of
information.
The Committee prohibits the export of strategic goods and
technology to embargoed destinations which are mostly the Warsaw
Pact nations and China. 2 ' Goods and technology that are considered
strategic are placed on one of three lists: (1) the International
Atomic Energy List, (2) the International Munitions List, or (3) the
International List. 22 The International List (IL) is the most impor-
tant because it includes dual-purpose technologies which are tech-
nologies that have a strategic value only when applied in certain
ways.
The IL is further divided into three subcategories: (1) embar-
goed items (International List I), (2) quantitatively controlled items
(International List II), and (3) exchange of information and surveil-
lance items (International List III). Items on List I may not be ex-
ported to the East without a permit; items on List II may be exported
but only in limited quantities; and items on List III may be exported
but must be reported to CoCom and their end use specified.2 3 Most
information technology items are on the International List I.
CoCom must rely on each member nation to adopt regulations
enforcing these different lists. In addition to deciding which goods
and technologies are placed on these lists, CoCom performs three
other functions: (1) it monitors compliance with the lists by mem-
bers; (2) it decides on exceptional requests for export of sensitive
technologies;2 4 and (3) it tries to harmonize licenses and penalties
among the members. 2 5
20 Hunt, Multilateral Cooperation in Export Controls-The Role of CoCom, 14 U. TOL. L.
REV. 1285, 1287 (1983).
21 Id. at 1288. For a list of these countries, see supra note 15 and accompanying text.
22 Hunt, CoCom and Other International Cooperation in Export Control, in COPING WITH
U.S. EXPORT CONTROLS: 1989 67, 71 (1989).
23 Originally, the IL list consisted of three different subcategories: embargoed goods
(International List I), export goods under quantitative restrictions (International List II),
and supervised goods (International List III). These categories were abandoned in 1964
and replaced by the current categories. G. BERTSCH, EAST-WEST STATEGIC TRADE, COCOM
AND THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE 33 (1983).
24 The Administrative Exception Notes (AEN) to the IL permit export to embargoed
destinations in certain situations. Goods may be exported only when a member decides
that the technical characteristics of the goods fall outside of the parameters of the AEN.
The member must then notify CoCom; however, concurrence is not required. Hunt,
CoCom and Other International Cooperation in Export Control, in COPING WITH U.S. EXPORT
CONTROLS: 1989 67, 72 (1989).
25 Hunt, Multilateral Cooperation in Export Controls-The Role of CoCom, 14 U. TOL. L.
REV. 1285, 1287 (1983).
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IV. U.S. and European Views of CoCom Regulations
CoCom members differ substantially in their views of CoCom
regulations because of their different cultural, strategic, and eco-
nomic backgrounds. Members have adhered to CoCom policy
largely based on the conviction that it is in their own security interest
to act in a unified manner. However, some members have used the
security argument as an excuse to further certain national economic
objectives. The conflict between economic and security interests is a
significant and recurring problem for CoCom. In 1983, the Euro-
pean Community and Japan criticized the security emphasis within
CoCom. Japan specifically objected to the expansion of the IL "be-
yond the scope of military materials." 26 Japan argued that "if re-
strictions are expanded in order to prevent the Soviet Union's
acquisition of foreign currencies, it may even lead to the denial of
East-West trade as a whole in the end."2 7 Japan also argued that the
development of East-West trade increased the Soviet economy's de-
pendence on the West, thereby strengthening national security.28
At a 1988 high level CoCom meeting, Japan and Europe again
noted CoCom's restrictive policy on exports to the Warsaw Pact na-
tions. They argued that the CoCom IL was outdated, too compli-
cated, and certainly too long to be an effective control mechanism. 29
They pointed to the INF Agreement and the increasingly liberal poli-
cies in the Soviet Union as evidence of a decreasing need for this
kind of regulation. The United States, at least at the time of the
meeting, was not convinced by these developments. During a visit to
the Netherlands shortly after the 1988 Executive Committee meet-
ing, Paul Freedenberg, the Undersecretary for Trade, declared that
technological superiority in the Western military was necessary to
counter the numerical supremacy of the East-Bloc military.
30
Freedenberg's argument has been weakened somewhat by Mikhail
Gorbachev's recent proposals to cut troops and armor and by the
changes taking place in Eastern Europe.
Currently, a contradiction exists between the European/
Japanese position and the U.S. position. The United States wants
more severe regulations on the export of strategic goods instead of a
shorter CoCom IL. Europe and Japan believe a shorter, more realis-
tic list will strengthen intra-CoCom relations and will also prevent
non-CoCom countries from taking over the trade market in the con-
trolled goods. 3' At the 1988 high level CoCom meeting, members
26 G. HUFBAER &J. ScHo-rr, supra, note 11, at 216 (citing Nihon Keizai, Mar. 16, 1983,
at I).
27 Id. (citing Nihon Keizai, Mar. 16, 1983, at I).
28 Id.
29 Brummelman, Reducing Embargo List Divides COCOM, NRC, Oct. 20, 1988.
30 Id.
31 As a result of U.S. industry complaints over the regulation of "simple" information
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reached a tentative consensus on a shortening of the list with a con-
comitant strengthening of control .32 However, to achieve a lasting
consensus, members must resolve the larger internal conflicts within
CoCom that result from differing opinions over how much control
should be exercised and when export licenses should be granted.
These questions, in turn, are a function of both security interests and
foreign policy interests. To better understand these conflicts, it is
necessary first to examine the application of CoCom laws in the Eu-
ropean Community and the United States.
A. European Viewpoint: Harmonization within the European
Community?
The European Community is currently discussing the possibility
of becoming a member of CoCom to force a harmonization of
CoCom regulations within the Community. This move could lead to
an unfortunate and dangerous mixing of European security and so-
cioeconomic interests. Moreover, it is unclear whether CoCom-type
regulations would be enforceable under the EEC Treaty.3 3
Although the general scope of the EEC Treaty does not extend to
security issues, two Articles have formed the basis for a Community
Council decision on a security issue and thus possibly could form a
legal basis for the implementation of the CoCom IL to the European
Community. Articles 223 and 224 of the Treaty give member states
full sovereignty over regulations and other laws concerning military
and semimilitary products. 34 Anticompetitive economic activities
within the Community may not be shielded, however.
On April 15, 1959, the EC Council established a list of products
technology such as personal computers and common integrated circuits, export licenses
have been issued almost automatically to U.S. exporters under the U.S. Omnibus Trade
and Competitiveness Act of 1988, 19 U.S.C. § 2901 (1988). Other nations continue to be
regulated under the more severe controls of the Export Administration Act, 50 U.S.C.
app. §§ 2401-2420 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
32 One problem with shortening CoCom lists, according to a high level employee of a
Dutch electronics company, is that some of the products on the list are so out-of-date that
they are not even being produced anymore. Brummelman, Reducing Embargo List Divides
COCOM, NRC, Oct. 20, 1988.
33 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Jan. 1, 1958, 298
U.N.T.S. I I [hereinafter EEC Treaty].
34 Article 223 provides:
1. The provisions of this Treaty shall not detract from the following
rules:
(a) No Member State shall be obliged to supply information the disclo-
sure of which it considers contrary to the essential interests of its security;
(b) Any Member State may take the measures which it considers neces-
sary for the protection of the essential interests of its security, and which are
connected with the production of or trade in arms, ammunition and war ma-
terial; such measures shall not, however, prejudice conditions of competition
in the Common Market in respect of products not intended for specifically
military purposes.
2. In the course of the first year after the date of the entry into force of
this Treaty, the Council, acting by means of a unanimous vote, shall deter-
1989]
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over which member states retain sovereignty.3 5 This list differs from
the CoCom IL in several ways. First, because the Council's list has
not been amended since it was first set out in 1959, it is technologi-
cally less up-to-date than the CoCom IL. Second, and more impor-
tantly, the contents of the Council's list concern only products with
specific military purposes. 36 Third, the Council's list is under the sov-
ereignty of the individual member states and not a part of Commu-
nity policy.3 7 This approach guarantees that member states will be
free to fulfill obligations designed to maintain peace and interna-
tional security. 38 Consultation on these measures between member
states is necessary only to ensure that the Common Market is not
disturbed.
A recent EC Court of Justice ruling held that Article 224 was
primarily a safeguard clause rather than a specific reservation of sov-
ereignty. 39 Thus it probably could not provide a legal basis for the
individual policies of member states on this subject. The EEC Treaty
is unclear on the extent to which member states have sovereignty
over the CoCom IL, especially when it controls many nonmilitary
technological products and information. It has been suggested that
the Council should either update its list to comply with the CoCom
IL, thereby giving the CoCom IL international legality, or it should
issue a regulation, based on Article 113, concerning common com-
mercial policy. 40 Although the latter option is more realistic, the fact
that Ireland would also be subject to the regulation makes this ap-
proach inappropriate. 4' Therefore, updating the list with a Directive
mine the list of products to which the provisions of paragraph 1 (b) shall ap-
ply.
3. The Council, acting by means of a unanimous vote on a proposal of
the Commission, may amend the said list.
Id.
Article 224 provides:
Member States shall consult one another for the purpose of enacting in
common the necessary provisions to prevent the functioning of the Common
Market from being affected by measures which a Member State may be called
upon to take in case of serious internal disturbances affecting public order, in
case of war or of serious international tension constituting a threat of war or
in order to carry out undertakings into which it has entered for the purpose
of maintaining peace and international security.
Id., art. 224.
35 This list was not published.
36 p. KAPTEYN & P. VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES 235-36 (1973); See Kuyper, DeAmerikaanse Uitvoerbeperkingen in een nieuwjasje:
een verbetering?, SOCIAAL ECONOMISCHE WETGEVING, Jan. 1987, at 20-22.
37 EEC Treaty, supra note 33, art. 223(l)(b).
38 See id., art. 224.
39 Marguerite Johnston v. Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, 1986-2 E. Comm.
Ct. J. Rep. 1651, [1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) $ 14,304
(1986). See also Kuyper, supra note 36, at 21.
40 Kuyper, supra note 36, at 21. A similar approach was used in the early phases of
the pipeline incidents. See infra text accompanying notes 86-88.
41 Ireland is the only EEC member who is not a member of NATO.
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would be more appropriate. A Directive would also give individual
member states the option of using legal instruments that are cur-
rently used for CoCom IL consensus. If these legal options were un-
available, member states would likely consider any restrictions on the
transfer of CoCom-listed products among member states as detri-
mental to the Common Market. New and different export licenses
would frustrate the guaranteed free flow of goods, services, capital,
and persons in the Common Market.42
B. U.S. Viewpoint: The Export Administration Act
The Export Administration Act (EAA)43 is the legal instrument
which protects U.S. security and foreign policy interests, and it is
also the main source of conflict within CoCom. The EAA authorizes
the President of the United States to "prohibit or curtail the exporta-
tion of any goods, technology, or other information subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States or exported by any person subject to
the jurisdiction of the United States." 44 Pursuant to Executive Or-
der No. 12,525, 45 the President delegated this authority to the Com-
merce Department which administers the Act through its Bureau of
Export Administration (BXA).
The EAA is essentially a relic of World War II. Its original pur-
pose was to prevent shortages of basic commodities necessary to
support the war effort.46 Only after the war were export controls
used for foreign policy and national security purposes and then
mainly against the Soviet Union.47 The Export Control Act of
194948 became one of the primary instruments for controlling ex-
ports to Eastern Europe. Under the Export Control Act of 1949, the
Department of Commerce reviewed prospective exports for their
possible military significance. 49 Congress has adhered to this same
approach in the revised act, the Export Administration Act of
42 Article 3 provides:
For the purposes set out in the preceding Article, the activities of the
Community shall include, under the conditions and with the timing provided
for in this Treaty:
(a) the elimination, as between Member States, of customs duties and
of quantitative restrictions in regard to the importation and exportation of
goods, as well as of all other measures with equivalent effect;
(c) the abolition, as between Member States, of the obstacles to the
free movement of persons, services, and capital;
EEC Treaty, supra note 33, art. 3(a),(c).
43 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2420 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
44 50 U.S.C. app. § 2405(a)(1) (Supp. V 1987).
45 50 Fed. Reg. 28,757 (1985).
46 See Liebman, The Export Administration Amendments Act of 1985, 20 INT'L LAw. 367,
367 (1986).
47 See Berman & Garson, supra note 8, at 795.
48 Ch. 11, 63 Stat. 7, 463 (1949) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2021-
2032 (1958)).
49 Leibman, supra note 46, at 367.
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1969,50 its amended versions of 197951 and 1985,52 the recent
amendments in the 1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act
(OTCA),53 and the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) 54
promulgated under the EAA.
The stated policy behind the EAA is clear:
It is the policy of the United States to use export controls ...
(A) to restrict the export of goods and technology which would
make a significant contribution to the military potential of any other
country or combination of countries which would prove detrimental
to the national security of the United States; (B) to restrict the ex-
port of goods and technology where necessary to further signifi-
cantly the foreign policy of the United States or to fulfill its declared
international obligations; and (C) to restrict the export of goods
where necessary to protect the domestic economy from the exces-
sive drain of scarce materials and to reduce the serious inflationary
impact of foreign demand.
5 5
Parts (B) and (C) integrate both security and economic interests of
the United States. The EAA has created problems because it does
not clearly distinguish between national security controls and foreign
policy controls.
The EAR generally prohibits the export of all commodities and
technical data unless a license is obtained. 56 The particular license
needed for a given export depends on the type of commodity or
technology being exported, the country where the shipment is des-
tined, and the end use of the commodity. 57 The EAR classifies coun-
tries into seven control groups depending on the strategic
importance of each country. 58 Countries that pose significant secur-
ity risks are labelled controlled countries and further restricted. 59
The EAR classifies commodities through the Commodity Control
List (CCL) which divides commodities into ten general groups ac-
50 Pub. L. No. 91-184, 83 Stat. 841 (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2413 (1971)).
51 Pub. L. No. 96-72, 93 Stat. 503 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-
2420 (1982 & Supp. V 1987)).
52 Pub. L. No. 99-64, 99 Stat. 120-159 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app.
§§ 2401-2420 (Supp. V 1987)).
53 19 U.S.C. § 2901 (1988).
54 15 C.F.R. §§ 768.1-799.2 (1989).
55 50 U.S.C. app. § 2402(2) (1982).
56 The EAR states:
[T]he export from the United States of all commodities, and all technical
data as defined in [§ 779.1], is hereby prohibited unless and until a general
license authorizing such export shall have been established or a validated
license or other authorization for such export shall have been granted by the
Office of Export Licensing....
15 C.F.R. § 770.3(a) (1989).
57 The technical requirements of obtaining a license are beyond the scope of this
article. The EAR, which is over 500 pages long, provide detailed guidance on the licens-
ing procedures. For a discussion see Hunt, The Export Licensing System, in COPING WITH
U.S. EXPORT CONTROLS: 1989 11 (1989).
58 15 C.F.R. § 770 Supp. 1 (1989).
59 Controlled countries are defined as any countries described in the Foreign Assist-
ance Act of 1961. 15 C.F.R. § 770.2 (1989).
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cording to the type of good. 60 The Defense Department, 6 1 the Com-
merce Department, the State Department, 6 2  and the Energy
Department all participate in deciding which items are placed on the
CCL. An exporter must consult the CCL to determine which license
is needed. 63
The Commerce Department investigates and reviews not only
license applicants but also their foreign subsidiaries, affiliates, joint
venturers, and licensees. 64 Foreign contract parties must submit
documentation to the BXA stating the disposition abroad of the
goods intended for export or re-export. 6 5 In addition to regulating
exports from the United States to certain foreign destinations, the
EAA also regulates the re-export of U.S. goods from one foreign
country to another.6 6 The re-export provisions have been extremely
controversial because of their extraterritorial reach and because of
the pipeline crisis.6 7 The EAAjustifies the regulation of foreign com-
panies based on its broad jurisdictional mandate over U.S. goods. 68
The extraterritorial application of the EAA has upset many European
countries and companies. According to sources within the Dutch
Government, U.S. officials informally agreed that there would be no
such investigations of affiliates in the Netherlands. 69 It is unclear
60 15 C.F.R. § 779 (1989).
61 The Defense Department delegates this task to the Defense Technology Security
Administration. See Note, The Department of Defense's Role in Free- World Export Licensing Under
the Export Administration Act, 1988 DUKE L.J. 785 (1988).
62 The BXA administers foreign policy related controls in consultation with the State
Department, which acts principally through its Office of East-West Trade. The Customs
Service and the Department of Commerce enforce the regulations.
63 The EAA authorizes a general license and a validated license. If an exporter quali-
fies for a general license, the exporter may ship the goods without submitting a license
application which is required for validated licenses. Validated licenses are divided into
four subcategories: a distribution license, a comprehensive operations license, a project
license, and a service supply license. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2403(a)(2) (Supp. V 987). The
distribution license authorizes export of goods to approved distributors or users of the
goods in countries other than controlled countries. Id. at § 2403(a)(2)(A). The Secretary
of Commerce grants distribution licenses primarily on the basis of the reliability of the
applicant and its foreign consignees not to divert goods to controlled countries. Id. See
also Albenese, The Distribution License Program, in COPING WITH U.S. EXPORT CONTROLS:
1989 243 (1989).
The comprehensive operations license authorizes exports and re-exports of technol-
ogy and related goods including items on the CCL. Export Administration Amendments
Act of 1985, 50 U.S.C. § 2403(a)(2)(B) (Supp. V 1987). The project license authorizes
exports of goods or technology for a specified activity. Id. at § 2403(a)(2)(C). The service
supply license authorizes exports of spare or replacement parts for goods previously ex-
ported. Id. at § 2403(a)(2)(D).
64 "The applicant must disclose fully on the license application the names of all the
parties who are concerned with or interested in the proposed export." 15 C.F.R.
§ 772.3(a)(2) (1989).
65 15 C.F.R. §§ 775.1-775.9 (1989).
66 15 C.F.R. § 774.1 (1989).
67 See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
68 See supra note 55.
69 The author states that the source of the statement is confidential. -ED.
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whether U.S. affiliates of Dutch companies are also immune.
In what appears to be a move towards liberalization, the United
States has agreed to review the status of controlled countries each
year rather than every third year. 70 The criteria used for determin-
ing the status of a controlled country include:
(A) the extent to which the country's policies are adverse to the
national security interests of the United States; (B) the country's
Communist or non-Communist status; (C) the present and potential
relationship of the country with the United States [and] with other
countries friendly or hostile to the United States; ... and (F) other
such factors as the President considers appropriate. 7 1
These guidelines permit a wide range of interpretation. In addition,
a country not on the CCL is not necessarily free from restrictions
because the United States may submit any country, including
CoCom countries, to export controls if there is a question of U.S.
security.7 2
The EAA defines technology as:
the information and know-how (whether in tangible form, such as
models, prototypes, drawings, sketches, diagrams, blueprints, or
manuals, or in intangible form, such as training or technical serv-
ices) that can be used to design, produce, manufacture, utilize, or
reconstruct goods, including computer software, and technical data,
but not the goods themselves. 73
Technology may be regulated under either security controls or for-
eign policy controls. The EAR generally states that when executing
these regulations it is unimportant on which ground the regulation is
based. 74 European countries are unclear over how the security pol-
icy and foreign policy are applied to information technology.
V. The Effect of Economic Interests on CoCom
One key element to a mutually acceptable security-export policy
is consensus among members over which technological products
pose security risks. One problem in reaching such a consensus is the
issue of economic interests in the different technological products.
As previously mentioned, the clash between economic and security
interests poses the greatest difficulty to the effectiveness of CoCom.
This problem has been particularly troublesome for CoCom
70 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404(b)(1) (Supp. V 1987).
71 Id.
72 Id. at § 2404(b)(1)(F).
73 Id. at § 2415(4).
74 The EAR provides:
No person may possess any commodities or technical data, controlled
for national security or foreign policy reasons under section 5 or 6 of the Act:
(1) With the intent to export such commodities or technical data in violation
of the Export Administration Act or any regulation, order, license or other
authorization under the Act, or (2) Knowing or having reason to believe that
the commodities or technical data would be so exported.
15 C.F.R. § 787.4(b) (1989).
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throughout the 1980s, most notably in the pipeline crisis. The cur-
rent state of disagreement between the United States and Europe
over the role of CoCom may be understood only in light of the vari-
ous failed attempts at resolving the tension between security and
trade.
At the Ottawa Summit in July 1981, the NATO Alliance agreed
to review export controls. The United States tried to convince its
European allies to tighten their export controls to create a uniform
Western policy. Because of a greater interest in trade than security,
the West European partners refused to participate. 75 They criticized
the United States for exercising too much control. The United
States classified some technologies as critical to national security
while the Europeans thought these same technologies were not criti-
cal. In general, Western Europe considered the U.S. initiative an un-
necessary intervention into European internal affairs and particularly
unwise during a time of tension between Europe and the United
States. 76
In several reports issued at this time, the U.S. Office of Technol-
ogy Assessment (OTA) recognized this divergence of views. The
OTA concluded: 77
(1) Trade with the Soviet Union has been far more important
for the economies of most of the United States' CoCom allies than
for the United States itself.
(2) There is a widespread skepticism in Europe andJapan over
the utility of trade sanctions for achieving Western political objec-
tives in the Soviet Union.
(3) These nations, unlike the United States, consider trade
with the Soviet Union a desirable part of their foreign and domestic
economic policies, and they largely eschew the use of foreign policy
for political purposes. These countries do not have national legisla-
tion comparable to EAA to provide a legal mechanism for such
controls.
(4) The United States and its allies had different expectations
for detente and therefore saw the result differently. In general,
Europeans have emphasized the gains in trading relations and the
continuing dialogue with Moscow, both of which contribute to the
maintenance of the European status quo. In the case of West Ger-
many, detente has significantly improved relations with East Ger-
many. Soviet activities in the Third World are seen by the
Europeans as violations of a U.S.-defined code of conduct, but not
necessarily a breach of the Soviet Union's detente commitments in
Europe.
75 See Smith, Reagan, Reflecting On Ottawa Parley, Praises Mitterand, N.Y. Times, July 23,
1981, at 1, col. 4.
76 Id. at 10, col. 3.
77 See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, TECHNOLOGY AND EAST-WEST TRADE
(1980); OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, TECHNOLOGY AND SOVIET ENERGY AVAILABIL-
ITY (1981); OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, TECHNOLOGY AND EAST-WEST TRADE: AN
UPDATE (1983).
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(5) Given the constraints under which it operates, CoCom
works well. It is an effective mechanism for implementing national
security controls in areas where the members agree that such con-
trols are necessary. CoCom does not function well where this con-
sensus is lacking.
(6) All CoCom partners agree that exports to the Soviet Union
and technology with direct military relevance should be controlled
for national security, but the United States tends to favor a much
broader interpretation of "military relevance" than its allies use.
Similarly, the European and Japanese definitions of "security" in-
clude an economic dimension which causes them to view trade with
the Soviet Union as a positive factor in East-West relations.
(7) . . . Western Europe and Japan view with apparent equa-
nimity the quantum rise in the level of East-West energy interdepen-
dence which will result from the West Siberian gas pipeline project.
(8) West Germany, France, and Italy all consider importing Si-
berian gas as a desirable way to increase and diversify energy sup-
plies while simultaneously stimulating equipment and technology
exports. The latter'consideration is also important to Japan.
(9) Western importers of Soviet energy, particularly gas, are
all mindful of the risks of energy dependence on the Soviet Union.
These countries have developed contingency plans in case of a cut-
off of Soviet gas. The plans may appear inadequate to U.S. observ-
ers; nevertheless, the nations involved believe that the potential
benefits of importing Soviet gas outweigh the risks. 7 8
The OTA concluded that these developments could endanger
the security of the Alliance. At the Ottawa Summit the European
countries felt that the United States did not understand the extent to
which history and geography influence European conceptions of na-
tional security. In particular, the European economies are export-
dependent and in proximity to the Soviet Union. Most importantly,
the European allies disliked the attempt by the United States to dic-
tate what the Europeans view as matters of internal economic pol-
icy. 79 The European countries also rejected the premise that the
U.S. security policy is solely a foreign policy not affecting the domes-
tic policies of the European allies.
Despite these differences, the foreign ministers of NATO
seemed to reach a much needed consensus a year later in the Ver-
sailles Summit ofJune 1982. They signed the Versailles Declaration
in which they agreed to approach East-West economic relations "in a
prudent and diversified manner consistent with our political and se-
curity interests."' 80 They further agreed to observe "commercial
prudence" in granting export credits to the Communist world and to
exchange information on "all aspects of our economic, commercial,
78 See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, TECHNOLOGY AND EAST-WEST TRADE: AN
UPDATE (1983).
79 See Smith, supra note 75.




and financial relations with Warsaw Pact countries." 8'
However, a week later French President Francois Mitterand de-
clared that the Versailles Declaration would not affect France's credit
policy with the Soviet Union.8 2 The United States believed this ac-
tion destroyed the impression of a unified commercial policy. An
OTA report concluded that the Versailles Declaration failed either
because European nations only nominally agreed to the policies
when they had no intention of carrying them out or because the
United States failed to accept Europe's view of its own political and
security interests. 8 3 The latter interpretation is probably correct.
The French declaration was likely only a public assertion of French
sovereignty. Nonetheless, the United States reacted predictably, stat-
ing that it could not accept a European limitation on U.S. foreign
policy interests even if the Europeans were acting only to protect
their sovereignty. What should have been a showcase of Western
unity proved to be the seed of disruption.8 4
In response to the European refusal to adhere to the U.S. inter-
pretation of the Versailles Declaration, President Reagan announced
on June 18, 1982, that the United States would extend its foreign
policy controls retroactively and extraterritorially to exports of oil
and gas equipment to the Soviet Union.8 5 Previously, on December
30, 1981, the U.S. Department of Commerce issued EAR amend-
ments designed to block the Soviet's building of the trans-Siberian
pipeline.8 6 President Reagan wanted to apply political pressure on
the Soviet Union after martial law was declared in Poland.8 7 The
controversy became known as the "pipeline crisis." The purpose of
the June 1982 EAR amendments was to cover completed contracts
for equipment produced by subsidiaries and licensees of U.S.-based
firms. 88
The European Community strongly objected to the June 1982
EAR amendments. Following its initial protest on the day the U.S.
measures were made public, the EC Council of Ministers sent a de-
81 Id. To maintain credibility, the United States depended on a unanimous statement
of unified Western commercial policy. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, TECHNOLOGY
AND EAST-WEST TRADE: AN UPDATE 64 (1983). The United States initially viewed the Ver-
sailles Declaration a success. Hunt, CoCom and Other International Cooperation in Export Con-
trol, in COPING WITH U.S. EXPORT CONTROLS 1989 71, 75-76 (1989).
82 OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, TECHNOLOGY AND EAST-WEST TRADE: AN
UPDATE 64-66 (1983).
83 Id.
84 The historical sensitivity of the Germans to this kind of versailler diktat may also
explain the failure of the Versailles Declaration.
85 Export of Oil and Gas Equipment to the Soviet Union: Statement on Extension of U.S. Sanc-
tions, 18 WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS, June 18, 1982, at 820.
86 47 Fed. Reg. 141 (1982) (amending 15 C.F.R. § 785.2(c) and the Commodity Con-
trol List, Supp. No. I to 15 C.F.R. § 799.1).
87 LeighJudicial Decisions, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 624, 626 (1983).
88 47 Fed. Reg. 141.
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tailed report (1982 EC Report) to the U.S. Department of State.8 9
The 1982 EC Report was followed by an "aide-memoire" on March
14, 1983.90 The affected individual EC member states91 also re-
leased ministerial declarations in which they condemned the U.S. ac-
tion.92 The United Kingdom, France, Italy, West Germany, and,
indirectly, the Netherlands ordered companies on their territory to
disregard the U.S. order and to fulfill their contractual obligations in
compliance with national laws. 93 Notwithstanding the European re-
action, the United States prohibited British, French, German, and
Italian companies 94 from importing any U.S.-origin goods or techni-
cal data relating to oil and gas exploration or to production, trans-
mission, or refinement of the Soviet project. 9 5
In the 1982 EC Report, the European Community criticized the
U.S. regulations:
The European Community believes that the U.S. regulations as
amended contain sweeping extensions of U.S. jurisdiction which are
unlawful under international law. Moreover, the new Regulations
and the way which they affect contracts in course of performance
seem to run counter to criteria of the Export Administration Act and
also to certain principles of U.S. public law.9 6
The report elaborated on these violations of international and U.S.
law. First, it discussed the extension of U.S. jurisdiction to non-U.S.
companies under international principles of territoriality and nation-
ality.9 7 Second, it analyzed the new regulations under U.S. law and
the existing framework of the EAA.
The European Community felt that neither the nationality prin-
ciple nor the territoriality principle as applied under international
89 European Communities: Comments on the U.S. Regulations Concerning Trade with the
U.S.S.R. (reprinted in 21 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 891 (1982)).
90 EC BULLETIN, March 1983 (reprinted in LOWE, EXTRATERRITORIALJURISDICTION 183-
87 (1983)).
91 France, Italy, and the United Kingdom experienced the greatest effect from the
regulations.
92 SeeAlliesJustifled in Attacks on Pipeline Policy, N.Y. Times, July 4, 1982, at Fl, col. 5.
93 See e.g. United Kingdom: Statement and Order Concerning the American Export Embargo with
Regard to the Soviet Gas Pipeline, (reprinted in 21 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 851 (1982)). See also
infra notes 176-81 and accompanying text.
94 These companies included AEG-Kanis and Mannesmann in West Germany;
Creusot-Loire and Dresser France in France; John Browne Engineering in the United
Kingdom; and Nuovo Pignone in Italy. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, TECHNOL-
OGY AND EAST-WEST TRADE: AN UPDATE 66 (1979).
95 47 Fed. Reg. 141-43 (1982) (amending 15 C.F.R. § 785.2(c) and the Commodity
Control List, Supp. No. I to 15 C.F.R. § 799.1).
96 21 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS at 891.
97 The report noted:
The principle that each state-and mutatis mutandis the Community inso-
far as powers have been transferred to it-has the right freely to organize and
develop its social and economic system has been confirmed many times in
international fora. The American measures clearly infringe the principle of
territoriality, since they purport to regulate the activities of companies in the




law could justify the 1982 amendments. The territoriality principle
could not justify regulating companies "not under the territorial
competence of the U.S." 98 The nationality principle could not jus-
tify regulating companies not incorporated in the United States. 99 In
Barcelona Traction, the International Court of Justice reaffirmed that
the nationality of a company should be determined by the place of
incorporation and the place of registration of the office of the com-
pany.' 00 Although this case actually decided an issue relating to the
doctrine of diplomatic protection, it illustrates the EC's interpreta-
tion of the nationality principle.' 0 '
The 1982 EC Report also rejected the U.S. idea that nationality
could be extended to goods or technology.' 0 2 The EAA asserted ju-
risdiction over persons owning or even handling those goods or
technology. Furthermore, the 1982 EAR amendments would, in
some instances, require non-U.S. corporations to obtain special per-
mission from U.S. authorities to export goods that were based on EC
technology and were produced in the European Community.' 0 3 The
European Community strongly condemned the statutory encourage-
ment of voluntary submission to U.S. public policy in trade matters.
The European Community considered the use of these "submission
clauses" an abuse of the freedom to contract because they circum-
vent the limits imposed on national jurisdiction by international law.
As one commentator stated: "The fact that submission clauses are
98 Id. The territoriality principle limits a state's jurisdiction to persons and goods
within its territory. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAWS OF THE
UNITED STATES § 17 (1965).
99 The nationality principle allows each state to regulate its nationals wherever they
are located. Id. at § 30.
100 1970 I.CJ. 3, 43.
101 See 21 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS at 894.
102 The report noted:
Goods and technology do not have any nationality and there are no
known rules under international law for using goods or technology situated
abroad as a basis of establishing jurisdiction over the persons controlling
them. Several Court cases confirm that U.S. jurisdiction does not follow U.S.
origin goods once they have been discharged in the territory of another
country.
21 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS at 894 n.2 (citing American President Lines v. China Mutual
Trading Co., 1953 A.M.C. 1510, 1526 (Hong Kong Sup. Ct.); Moens v. Ahlers North Ger-
man Lloyd, 30 R.W. 360 (Antwerp Tribunal of Commerce 1966)).
103 The report noted:
The public policy ('ordre public') of the European Community and of its
Member States is thus purportedly replaced by U.S. public policy which Eu-
ropean companies are forced to carry out within the E.C., if they are not to
lose export privileges in the U.S. or to face other sanctions. This is an unac-
ceptable interference in the affairs of the community.
21 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS at 896.
This effect is similar to that of the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, 17
U.S.C. §§ 901-914 (Supp. V 1987). Under the Act, the European Community was re-
quired to follow U.S. controls because of the possibility of being excluded from the U.S.
semiconductor market. The European Community followed the U.S. Act but also issued a
Directive that resulted in a number of European versions of the U.S. Act.
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couched in the language of contract cannot disguise the fact that they
deal with matters of public and not private law, and are to be judged
according to the standards of public international law." 104
The European Community also rejected two other U.S. bases
for jurisdiction: the protective principle and the effects doctrine.
The protective principle allows a nation jurisdiction to proscribe acts
done outside its territory when they threaten its security. 10 5 The
protective principle could not justify the EAR amendments because
they were passed pursuant to foreign policy controls rather than na-
tional security controls.' 0 6 The effects doctrine was inapplicable be-
cause there were no direct, foreseeable, or substantial effects within
the United States.' 0 7 In addition, the retroactive application of the
EAR to existing contractual obligations was a significant point of
contention. Even members of Congress and industry considered this
retroactive effect contrary to U.S. public policy.' 08
Finally, the report criticized the failure of the United States to
apply the "balancing of interests" approach which had been applied
by several U.S. courts.' 09 This test, which is used in the Restatement
(Second) of Foreign Relations Law,I 10 requires that a country exer-
cise its enforcement jurisdiction so as to minimize potential conflicts.
The report cited several of the Restatement (Second) factors used to
balance the interests of conflicting jurisdictions:
a) vital national interests of each of the states;
b) the extent and the nature of the hardship that inconsistent
enforcement actions would impose upon the person;
c) the extent to which the required conduct is to take place in
the territory of the other state; and
d) the nationality of the person on whom the law is to be
enforced. 11 I
The European Community expected that the balancing test
would be applied in the rule making stage as well as the enforcement
104 Lowe, supra note 90, at 525.
105 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 33 (1965).
106 21 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS at 897.
107 Under the effects doctrine, a state may also proscribe conduct occurring outside its
territory that causes direct, foreseeable, and substantial effects which constitute elements
of a crime or tort within the territory. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES § 18 (1965). See 21 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS at 897.
10 See New Technology Puts Strains on Old Laws, CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY WEEKLY,
Jan. 28, 1984, at 135-41.
109 See, e.g., Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976);
United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 691 F.2d 1384 (11th Cir. 1982). See also Burnett,
Castell, & Robinson, Extraternitoriality and Data Flows, TRANSNAT'L DATA & COMM. RPT.,
June 1986, at 27-28.
1 10 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 40 (1965).
I 1 21 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS at 899 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES § 40 (1965)).
[VOL. 14
TECHNOLOGY TRADE
stage. Because EAR amendments do not receive substantive judicial
review,' t2 a clash of enforcement jurisdictions could occur before
U.S. courts would have an opportunity to apply the balancing test.
The EAA authorizes the use of a balancing test." 3 The European
Community complained that President Reagan did not follow these
provisions, and thus failed to take into account several important
factors: 0
(1) the supra-national status of the European Community on
trade issues;
(2) the fact that the conduct solely affected E.C.- territories;
(3) the nationality ties and other links subject to the June 22,
1982 amendments primarily affected E.C. companies, not U.S.
companies;
(4) there were justified expectations by E.C. companies, which
were hurt by the U.S. measures.] 14
The problems created by the 1982 EAR amendments were evi-
dent in Dresser Indus. Inc. v. Baldridge." 1 5 The 1982 EAR amendments
prohibited both the export of strategic technology to the Soviet
Union from the United States and the re-export from any other na-
tion." 6 The new regulations applied to foreign firms controlled by
U.S. companies, foreign companies using U.S. technology under a
licensing agreement with a U.S. company, and foreign companies us-
ing U.S.-originated technology as a part of its product.' 17 Prior to
the promulgation of these regulations Dresser-France, a wholly-
owned subsidiary of Dresser Industries, Inc. (Dresser-USA), entered
into contracts to deliver gas pipeline compressors to the Soviet
Union. These compressors were manufactured by Dresser-France
under a license granted by Dresser-USA. Before the 1982 EAR
amendments, the EAR did not cover products manufactured by for-
eign subsidiaries of U.S. companies or by companies using U.S. tech-
112 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2412 (a)-(b), (e) (1982 & Supp. Ill 1985) (amended 1988) (pre-
scribing exemption from Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 551, 553-559, 701-
706 (West 1977 & Supp. 1988), and imposing substitute appeal provisions).
113 "[T]he President shall consider: (c) the reaction of other countries to the imposi-
tion . . .or expansion of ... export controls by the United States .... ." 50 U.S.C.
§ 2405(b)(1)(C) (Supp. V 1987). "[T]he President shall determine that reasonable efforts
have been made to achieve the purposes of the controls through negotiations or other
alternative means." Id. at § 2405(e). "[T]he President shall take all feasible steps to initi-
ate and conclude negotiations with appropriate foreign governments for the purpose of
securing the cooperation of such foreign governments in controlling the export to coun-
tries and consignees to which the United States export controls apply of any goods or
technology comparable to goods or technology controlled under this section." Id. at
§ 2405(h)(1).
114 21 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS at 901.
'15 549 F. Supp. 108 (D.D.C. 1982). For a more detailed analysis of this case, see
Leigh, supra note 87 at 626-28.
116 15 C.F.R. § 785.2 (1989). Re-export is defined as the "reexport, transshipment, or
diversion of commodities or technical data from one foreign destination to another." 15
C.F.R. § 770.2 (1989).
117 15 C.F.R. § 779.8(a)(I)-(3) (1989).
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nical information:' 1 8 The new regulations applied regardless of
when the information was exported to the subsidiaries or licensees,
and also provided for civil, administrative, and criminal sanctions.' 1 9
Attempting to comply with the regulations, Dresser-USA or-
dered Dresser-France to cease manufacture of the compressors and
suspend shipments to the Soviet Union. The French Government
then ordered Dresser-France to fulfill its contractual obligations or
face sanctions under French law. Dresser-USA and Dresser-France
were thus subject to conflicting regulations of U.S. and French law.
Dresser-USA and Dresser-France brought suit in federal court seek-
ing a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief from the U.S. regu-
lations.' 20 They argued that the EAA did not authorize jurisdiction
over Dresser-France, that enforcement would violate international
law, and that they were denied due process of law because they were
unable to seek judicial review of the regulations.121 The court held
that injunctive relief was inappropriate in light of the public interest
in the enforcement of the regulations at issue and in the essential
purpose of the regulations to aid U.S. foreign policy. 122 However,
strong protests from the French Government and the European
Community eventually forced the U.S. Government to withdraw the
regulations in October of 1982.123
As one commentator observed, neither of the traditional princi-
ples ofjurisdiction-territoriality and nationality-justifed the exten-
sion of U.S. export regulations to a company that fell completely
within French jurisdiction. 2 4 Although it was owned by a U.S.-based
parent company, Dresser-France had no operations in the United
States nor was it a U.S. national. Under recognized legal principles,
Dresser-France was a French national because it was incorporated in
France.' 25 The U.S. Government asserted that shipments to the So-
viet Union by Dresser-France would have a "direct and substantial"
effect on U.S. foreign policy. 126 The United States runs the risk of
118 15 C.F.R. § 779.8(a)(l)-(3) (1989) (as amended by 47 Fed. Reg. 27,250 (1982)).
''9 15 C.F.R. §§ 768.4(b), 787.1, 788.1, 790.2(a) (1989).
120 Dresser, 549 F. Supp. at 108.
121 See Leigh, supra note 87 at 627.
122 Dresser, 549 F. Supp. at 110.
123 The Department of Commerce suspended the regulations in Oct. 1982. 15 C.F.R.
§§ 779.4(f)(l)(i)(P), 785.2(a)(5), 785.2(c), 790.8, 799.1 Supp. I and 799.2 Supp. 1 (1989)
(removed, revised, or amended by 47 Fed. Reg. 51,850 (1982)). In March 1983, the
French Government nonetheless sent an aide-memoire in protest even though the EAA
was due to expire on Oct. 1, 1983. France wanted to influence the new revisions to the
EAA that would be enacted.
124 Leigh, supra note 87 at 627.
125 Id. (citing The Convention of Establishment Between the United States of America
and France, Dec. 21, 1960, art. XIV, para. 5, 11 U.S.T. 2398, T.I.A.S. No. 4625, which
states that "companies constituted under the applicable laws and regulations of either
High Contracting Party shall be deemed companies thereof.").
126 Dresser, 549 F. Supp. at 110. The "direct and substantial" effect test is required by
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severely damaging relations with other nations by such excessive as-
sertions of foreign policy and security interests.
Strangely enough, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that in the
opposite situation, where the situs of a foreign subsidiary is the
United States, the U.S. Government has exclusive jurisdiction. In
Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avogliano, 127 a New York subsidiary of a
Japanese trading company argued that it did not have to comply with
U.S. employment and civil rights laws because of a bilateral treaty
between the United States and Japan. The Court. denied the protec-
tion of the treaty observing that "Sumitomo is a company of the
United States, not a company ofJapan."' 28 Although limited to the
interpretation of the treaty, the ruling may have broader implica-
tions. The Court stated:
Determining the nationality of a company by its place of incor-
poration is consistent with prior U.S. treaty practice. The place-of-
incorporation rule also has the advantage of making determination
of nationality a simple matter. On the other hand, appplication of a
control test could certainly make nationality a subject of dispute.129
Also, in Wisconsin v. Pelican Insurance Co., 130 as noted in the 1982 E.C.
report, a U.S. federal court held that it did not have jurisdiction to
enforce foreign penal statutes.' 3 ' If a foreign government asserted
that a U.S. licensee of a foreign company violated that foreign gov-
ernment's export restrictions, a U.S. federal court would decline ju-
risdiction because U.S. courts will not enforce foreign penal
statutes.'
3 2
The extraterritorial effect of U.S. laws has increasingly annoyed
several nations. These nations consider the application of U.S. law
in a foreign jurisdiction an infringement of sovereignty. The United
States justifies this policy under the "effects doctrine." According to
the argument, the internal security effects within the United States of
some activities abroad justify U.S. enforcement of its laws in other
jurisdictions. Two commentators noted the problem with the U.S.
view:
If foreign subsidiaries, chartered under the laws of a foreign
sovereign, are nationals of the nation of a parent enterprise,from the
fact of being controlled by that parent, the opportunities for sovereign
conflict are substantially increased. While in part a problem of inter-
national complexity, two states seeking to regulate conduct partially
within and partially without their territories, it should also be viewed
the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 18(b) (1965). See supra note 107.
127 457 U.S. 176 (1982).
128 Id. at 182.
129 Id. at 185 n.ll (citation omitted).
I0 127 U.S. 265 (1888).
131 Id. at 290.
132 21 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS at 898 n.1. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT
OF LAws § 89 (1969).
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as a direct challenge to the sovereignty of the nation which charters
the subsidiary. 1
3 3
The pipeline crisis and the 1982 EAR amendments point out the
problems that arise when the United States and Europe do not agree
on common objectives.
VI. Other Conflicts Created By the Extraterritorial Application of
U.S. Export Policy
The extraterritorial application of the EAA has created several
other problems in addition to those associated with the pipeline cri-
sis and the 1982 EAR amendments. In 1981, the U.S. Government
attempted to strengthen its control over technology exports through
"Operation Exodus," which was an enforcement program by the
U.S. Customs Service designed to discover and interdict illegal tech-
nology exports. 134 By 1983 this program led to the arrest of 276
persons in the United States for illegal export of strategic goods and
weaponry to the East Bloc.' 3 - Under "Operation Exodus" technol-
ogy transfers were investigated more closely, and posters in the tra-
dition of "Loose Lips Sink Ships" requested U.S. companies to
inform the U.S. Customs Service of any suspicious activity.' 36 U.S.
industry eventually resisted the operation because of the considera-
ble loss of trade profits and the resulting trade imbalance.' 3 7 As a
result, since 1985, national export restrictions have been relaxed
somewhat.
133 D. ROSENTHAL & W. KNIGHTON, NATIONAL LAWS AND INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE 6
(1982) (emphasis in original).
134 Operation Exodus was begun in 1981. See generally Weyhrauch, Operation Exodus:
The United States Government's Program To Intercept Illegal Exports Of High Technology, 7 CoM-
PUTER L.J. 203 (1986).
135 Netherlands Department of Economic Affairs.
136 One poster read:
Special Agents of the U.S. Customs Office are responsible for investigat-
ing criminal violations regarding illegal high technology and munitions
transfer.
If you or your company has been the recipient of any suspicious inquir-
ies regarding your high technology or munitions products or if you have any
information or suspicions regarding high technology or munitions transfer
please call exodus coordinator....
U.S. Gets Tough On Technology Transfer, TRANSNAT'L DATA AND COMM. REP., Mar. 1986, at 9-
10.
137 A DOC spokesman estimated that the United States lost $300 to $600 million in
exports to the Soviet Union as a result of the Dec. 1981 export controls on oil and gas
equipment and technology. Economic Relations with the Soviet Union: Hearings Before the Senate
Subcomm. on International Economic Policy and the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 97th Cong.,
2d Sess. 11 (1982) (statement of Lionel H. Olmer, Undersec'y for Int'l Trade, Dep't Of
Commerce).
The losses due to the June 1982 re-export regulations were estimated at $850 million
or 25,000 jobs. H.R. REP. No. 762, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1982). Congressman Michel,
commenting on the Caterpillar Tractor debacle, stated that it cost the United States
roughly 35,000 man-years of labor and $500 million in lost sales. 129 CONG. REC. H7797
(statement of Rep. Michel) (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1983).
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There has been discussion in the United States over the cost to
U.S. industry from the stringent requirements of the EAA. One area
that was criticized was the failure of the EAA to focus on whether
similar products are available from sources outside the United States
(sometimes referred to as the foreign availability problem) instead of
on the potential military usefulness of the technology. As one com-
mentator observed: "[T]here is no sense in penalizing United States
companies with a substantial loss of sales .... if the purpose of the
controls is not accomplished and the results are merely symbolic."' 38
The U.S. Congress incorporated this foreign availability provision
into the 1979 and 1985 revisions to the EAA:
[T]he President shall not impose export controls for foreign
policy or national security purposes on the export from the United
States of goods or technology which he determines are available
without restriction from sources outside the United States in suffi-
cient quantities and comparable in quality to those produced in the
United States so as to render the controls ineffective in achieving
their purposes, unless the President determines that adequate evi-
dence has been presented to him demonstrating that the absence of
such controls would prove detrimental to the foreign policy or na-
tional security of the United States. 139
In 1975, Control Data Corporation contracted to sell an "old"
Cyber-76 computer to the Soviet Union for research and weather
forecasting.' 40 After two years of research on the question, the
Commerce Department denied permission to export the com-
puter.' 4 ' Stanley J. Marcuss, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Domes-
tic Commerce, explained the decision: "as is the case with almost
any advanced computer, the Cyber-76 has potentially military as well
as peaceful uses."' 142
As the Control Data situation illustrates, the U.S. Government is
often slow in making determinations on the foreign availability of
comparable goods and technology. Two commentators have pro-
posed solutions to solve this problem. Professor Homer Blair sug-
gests the United States could better protect its security interests by a
self-policing export control system under which the exporting com-
pany submitted an affidavit describing in detail where the goods are
available. 43 He proposes that the affidavit would accompany the ex-
port license application and would be signed by three people in the
138 Blair, Export Controls on Nonmilitary Goods and Technology: Are We Penalizing the Soviets
or Ourselves?, 21 TEx. INT'L L.J. 362, 373 (1986).
139 Pub. L. No. 99-64, § 104, 99 Stat. 122 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 2403(c) (Supp. V
1987)).
140 Computer Exports To The Soviet Union: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on International Eco-
nomic Policy and Trade of the House Comm. on Intern'l Relations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1977)
(statement of Stanley, J. Marcuss, Dep'ty Ass't Sec'y for Domestic Commerce, Dep't of
Commerce).
14" Id. at 10-13.
142 Id. at 7.
143 Blair, supra note 138, at 371-72.
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company. 144 The company would be held responsible for the cor-
rectness of the information by criminal prosecution. 145 Harold Le-
vine argues that Professor Blair's solution is not strict enough
although it does recognize the foreign availability problem. Mr. Le-
vine distinguishes between technologies that are useful and those
that are critical because they would provide the Soviet Union with a
revolutionary increase in its technology. He advocates that Congress
establish a critical technology list.146
Certainly such a list could serve any policy or interest. It is just a
question of interpretation of the terms used. The control list, like
the EAA provisions, would prove to be highly discretionary. No
method can guarantee that technology export regulations will be ap-
plied in a rational way. For example, U.S. authorities might regard
as a security risk the export of information or advanced technology
to an East Bloc country from a European country. Yet, the export of
a comparable product from the United States to the same recipient
would not be considered detrimental to the foreign policy or security
of the United States. The recent 1988 OTCA amendments appear to
adopt much of the approach advocated by Professor Blair.' 47
In addition to creating problems for industry, the EAA unneces-
sarily restricts scientific research. Placing restrictions on scientific in-
formation undercuts the liberalizing tendency of the EAA. Exchange
of information is crucial for commercial and scientific advances, and
harsh export controls hamper the free flow of such exchanges. The
Declaration of Policy to the EAA recognizes this fact:
It is the policy of the United States to sustain vigorous scientific
enterprise. To do so involves sustaining the ability of scientists and
other scholars freely to communicate research findings, in accord-
ance with applicable provisions of law, by means of publication,
teaching, conferences and other form of scholarly exchange. 148
Despite this stated policy, the 1985 amendments to the EAA contin-
ued to prohibit the export of scientific information without a license
when such information has a negative effect on U.S. security or for-
144 Professor Blair advocates that a corporate officer, the corporate lawyer, and the
person who researched the foreign availability sign the affidavit. Id. at 372.
145 Id.
146 Levine, Technology Transfer. Export Controls Versus Free Trade, 21 TEX. INT'L L.J. 373,
381-82 (1986).
147 A new section provides:
The Secretary shall make a foreign availability determination ... on the
Secretary's own intiative or upon receipt of an allegation from an export li-
cense applicant that such availability exists. In making any such determina-
tion, the Secretary shall accept the representations of applicants made in
writing and supported by reasonable evidence, unless such representations
are contradicted by reliable evidence, including scientific or physical exami-
nation, expert opinion based upon adequate factual information, or intelli-
gence information.
50 U.S.C. § 2404(0(3)(A) (Supp. V 1987).




The Commerce Department may also classify information as
sensitive, although not "classified" information in the traditional
sense, and on that ground withhold the information from publica-
tion, dissemination, or use. In a policy statement in 1986,150 former
National Security Adviser John Poindexter emphasized the strategic
importance of information and information systems. The statement
implemented an earlier National Security Directive which provided
the "initial objective, policies and organizational structure to guide
the conduct of national activities toward safeguarding systems which
process or communicate sensitive information from hostile exploita-
tion."' 5 1 The 1986 statement explained this policy:
Federal Departments and agencies shall ensure that telecommu-
nications and automated information systems handling sensitive but
unclassified information will protect such information to the level of
risk and the magnitude of loss or harm that could result from disclo-
sure, loss, misuse, alteration or destruction.1
5 2
The crucial issues for the implementation of this policy are how sen-
sitive information is defined and who determines it.
The text describes what is "sensitive information":
Sensitive but unclassified information is information the disclo-
sure, loss, misuse, alteration, or destruction of which could ad-
versely affect national security or other federal government
interests. National security interests are those unclassified matters
that relate to the national defense or to foreign relations of the U.S.
Government. Other government interests are those related, but not
limited to the wide range of government or government-derived
economic, human, financial, industrial, agricultural, technological
and law enforcement information, as well as the privacy or confiden-
tiality of personal or commercial proprietary information provided
to the U.S. Government by its citizens. 15
3
The policy applies to all government entities and related contractors.
The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency is responsible for
identifying the sensitive but unclassified information. The execution
of controls, protective regulations, and other protective measures
are the responsibility of the head of each agency or department.
Thus the NSC Directive further controls information possibly be-
yond the EAA.
European countries do not even accept "pure" security regula-
tions with extraterritorial effects. They doubt the claim of a security
interest in the economic aspects of trade in information technology
149 Id. § 2402(a)(1).
150 U.S. Policy Controlling Sensitive But Unclassied Information, reprinted in TRASNAT'L DATA
AND COMM. REP., Jan. 1987, at 7.
151 See U.S. Imposes Economic and Technical Data Controls, TRANSNAT'L DATA AND COMM.
REP., Jan. 1987, at 6.
152 See id. at 7.
153 Id.
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and other advanced technology. However, if a nation cannot protect
its sovereignty through export control regulations it will find alter-
nate means. Because U.S. leadership in' information technology is
decreasing, it is understandable from a security as well as an eco-
nomic perspective that the United States would attempt to enforce
extraterritorial export control regulations on her allies. The ques-
tion is whether extraterritorial export control regulations with a clear
economic purpose are a breach of the sovereignty of the countries
affected by those regulations. Regulations that protect national se-
curity within a nation's borders are clearly acceptable because a na-
tion has a sovereign right to protect its natural resources. But it is
questionable whether this sovereign right also allows a nation to en-
act laws, such as the EAA re-export provisions, which operate within
another nation's borders. 5
4
VII. Current View of the European Community: Is the 1982 EC
Report Still Up To Date?
Several EC member states considered the export controls ap-
plied by the United States in the early 1980s a "rude jolt." It has
colored their view of all subsequent export control efforts.' 55 The
restrictions have had the positive effect of stimulating the search for
non-U.S. sources of information and information technology. 156
Both EC Commissioner Willy de Clerq and the European Parliament
sharply criticized the application of the EAA, particularly the regula-
tions on the re-export of assembled information technology, infor-
mation, or knowledge. They viewed these measures as going far
beyond CoCom regulations.
Europeans continue to believe that security and foreign policy
regulations should not be applied extraterritorially. In April 1987,
Mr. de Clerq expressed this feeling in a general discussion on trade
barriers:
If the United States ,Congress is considering a series of billes
[sic] aimed at restricting trade still further, it should wake up to the
fact that "unfair trade" is not, as Congress seems to imagine, some-
thing practiced exclusively by America's tradin partners. The
United States is not innocent of these 
practices. 5 7
Although the EAA defines national security, it does not define for-
eign policy, making U.S. export controls purely discretionary on the
154 For example, persons are prohibited from "export[ing] any technical data from the
United States with the knowledge that it is to be reexported, directly or indirectly in whole
or in part, from the authorized country(ies) of ultimate destination." 15 C.F.R.
§ 779.8(a)(2) (1989).
155 See infra text accompanying note 157.
156 See COMMITrEE ON SCIENCE, ENGINEERING AND PUBLIC POLICY, BALANCING THE NA-
TIONAL INTEREST 195 (1987).
157 " 'Too Many U.S. Trade Barriers are Blocking Community Exports' Says Willy de
Clercq," European Community President, Press Release, Brussels (Apr. 2 1987).
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part of the U.S. Government. Although the European Community
generally shares the security interests of the United States, it views
the extraterritorial application of U.S. laws within the jurisdiction of
the European Community as unacceptable and contrary to the prin-
ciples of international law.
In the 1988 OTCA amendments, the U.S. Congress made sev-
eral changes in the EAA in an attempt to alleviate some of the
problems discussed in this Article. The most significant change was
the addition of a provision designed to address some of the
problems relating to the re-export provision. A new subsection has
been added: "No authority may be required . .. to reexport any
goods ... to any country which maintains export controls... pursu-
ant to [CoCom] .... ,,158 However, the OTCA expressly provides an
exemption in four important areas, 159 thereby undermining much of
the force of the new subsection. Given the broad exception, this new
subsection will not likely liberalize the EAA significantly. European
countries remain skeptical despite these recent amendments to the
EAA. In a 1989 report' 60 the European Community continued to
assert that the EAA applies extraterritorially in violation of interna-
tional law although the European Community admitted that the
1988 OTCA relaxed national security controls somewhat.16 1 Thus
most of the criticisms of the 1982 EC Report remain valid.
VIII. The Netherlands Experience
The implementation of CoCom rules in the Netherlands illus-
trates some of the general problems associated with CoCom. 162 The
Netherlands is a loyal follower of CoCom regulations, but it is often
critical of regulations that go beyond those agreements. The
Netherlands is quick to defend principles of international law, and
the independence of states and national policies. For example, the
Government of the Netherlands recommends that companies refuse
to accept submission clauses. This attitude, however; can cause prac-
158 50 U.S.C.A. § 2404(a)(4)(A) (West Supp. 1989).
159 The four areas include:
(i) supercomputers;
(ii) goods or technology for sensitive nuclear uses ...
(iii) devices for surreptitious interception of wire or oral communica-
tions; and
(iv) goods or technology intended for such end users as the Secretary
may specify by regulation.
Id. at §'2404(a(4)(B).
160 COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITITES, DIRECTORATE-GENERAL I, EXTERNAL
RELATIONS, 1989 REPORT ON U.S. BARRIERS To TRADE (May 1, 1989).
161 Id. at 34.
162 For a comparison of Netherlands law and U.S. law in this area, see Terporten,
Vergunningen Voor De Export Van Computers En Computersoftware Uit De Verenigde Staten Van
Amerika Naar Nederland, I COMPUTERRECHT 3-11 (1987).
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tical problems for Dutch corporations who are active in the U.S.
market.
As with other CoCom countries, the Netherlands has imple-
mented the CoCom lists into its national regulations, namely the Ex-
port Decree on Strategic Goods (the Act).' 63 The Crown may take
Import and Export Decrees only when it determines that the Decree
is required in the interest of internal or external security; the interna-
tional legal order; or a related international arrangement.1 64 Unlike
the EAA, the Act does not mention foreign policy as a basis for con-
trol. Violation of the Act or the decrees based upon it constitutes a
felony punishable on the basis of the Wet op de economische delicten. 165
The Decree authorizes the Secretaries of Economic and Foreign Af-
fairs to issue special regulations for goods of strategic importance.
The measures may include prohibitions of import, export, or transit
without license, and authorizations for the Minister responsible for
imposing certain surcharges.
As in most other CoCom nations, "goods" described in the De-
cree include those designed or suitable for the transfer of informa-
tion about the design, production, or use of technology. Exceptions
are made for software (because it is a separate item on the list) and
for publicly known technology. 166 Similarly, computers and related
goods, such as software embedded in the computers, are considered
to be of strategic importance. In a recent case, several persons in the
Netherlands were arrested with the help of U.S. authorities for ex-
porting computer parts to Bulgaria.' 67
Currently in the Netherlands the twelfth adjustment to the 1963
Decree is in force, plus an adaption in force as of January 1, 1988.
The listed strategic goods, list strategische goederen, and related tech-
nology, including books, papers, and other information, are sub-
jected to a licensing system directed by the Department of Economic
Affairs. The list contains computer software and manuals,' 68 com-
puter hardware and related technology, 169 and semiconductor
163 See Export Decree on Strategic Goods 1963, Uitvoerbesluit Strategische Goederen
1963, Stb. 128 (amended in Stb. 196, Royal Decree (KB) Apr. 8, 1988), based on the
Import and Export Act 1962, Im-en Export wet 1962, Stb. 295.
164 Id.
165 W.E.D. art. 1, sub. 1 art. 2. 1,June 22, 1950, Stb.K 258, by order of the economic
police, Econoische Controle Dienst.
166 Item 2000, bijlage II.jo., and item 1566 concerning software. Compare the recent
development concerning the classification of "technical information" in the U.S. Export
Administration Act.
167 Prosecution was begun in the Alkmaar Regional Court and is now on appeal before
the Amsterdam Court. Although no information about the case is available because the
case is sub jure, the length of time to prosecute suggests that there is some indecision as to
what crime has been committed.
168 Item 1566 on the list.
169 Item 1565 on the list.
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chips.' 70 Currently, the list directly corresponds to the CoCom IL.
Export of these goods without a permit is prohibited not only to East
Bloc countries, but to all countries except Belgium and Luxembourg
where the dangers of a "three-corner trade" or diversion are pres-
ent. Exports to China are subject to a more liberal system of licens-
ing as with CoCom.
The list is not as strict as it may appear. For example, it is possi-
ble to apply for an exception to the embargo with the Centrale Dienst
voor In-en Uitvoer. Due to the recent discussions within CoCom, the
Netherlands, in coordination with other CoCom states, has decided
to include more computer technology in the liberal process used for
China. Permission, however, is particulary dependent on the risk of
diversion and on the prevailing political situation. 171
A. Penal Law (Wetboek van Strafrecht)
Generally, the Netherlands Penal Code makes it risky to trans-
port any information to another country if the information endan-
gers a vital interest of the originating state. The publication of data
originating from government sources or restricted areas could be
classified as such. In Articles 92 through 107 of the Second Book
(Felonies), there are several activities which, under Netherlands
criminal law, endanger state security. Article 98 states that a person
may not supply any data or goods that clearly represent a security
risk to a person who is not entitled to this information. Violations of
this article may result in a maximum of six years in prison or a maxi-
mum fine of Dfl. 100,000. The same penalty applies to anyone who
discloses data from a restricted area that is of vital importance to the
security of the state or her allies. If this information is made public
or communicated to a foreign power, the person responsible can be
punished even more severely.' 72 Furthermore, it is a criminal of-
170 Item 1564 on the list.
171 The government typically denies these factors. See also Netherlands Sanction Act
of 1977. This act was not especially enacted for the protection of strategic interests, but it
certainly has an effect. For instance, the Sanction Decree on Licenses to South Africa of
1982, which is based on this Act, forbids the export of technology and accompanying in-
formation for the construction or maintenance of weapons and related systems in South
Africa.
172 The sentence could be 15 years imprisonment. Second Book (Felonies), art. 98(a).
If the activity takes place during a time of war or is done in the service of another power,
the punishment is even greater-20 years or life imprisonment. Id., art. 98(a)(2). A per-
son may be imprisoned for six years for making preparations for the aforementioned fel-
ony. Id., art. 98(a)(3). If state secrets are revealed by a person's culpable behavior, he may
be imprisoned for one year. Id., art. 98(b). A civil servant who reveals information that he
should have known to be a state secret may also receive a one year term. Id., art. 272.1.
In addition, there are other regulations for civil servants in the General Regulations
for Civil Servants. Algemene Rijks Ambtenaren Reglement. Article 55 states that civil ser-
vants may not divulge anything heard in the line of duty. Article 59 establishes a general
obligation of secrecy. These articles cover not solely strategic information but also all
information about state affairs that are considered "sensitive."
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fense to hold this information illegally to oneself or to attempt to
obtain this information illegally, intentionally, or by false means.173
The law does not describe the kind of information that is consid-
ered vital for state security. It may be safely assumed that the prohi-
bition covers information ranging from confidential information
(vertrouwlik) to secret information (zeer geheim). It does not matter
whether the information is embodied in letters, books, telecommuni-
cation signals, semiconductor chips, micro dots, or the human voice.
The act of communicating the information as such constitutes the
criminal act. Under the Dutch Constitution, Freedom of Information
is restricted by the individual responsibility as prescribed by law. 174
B. Examples of Economic and Security Conflicts
The following cases illustrate the spectrum of results that arise
from intermingling economic and security interests in a single policy.
1. Compagnie Europeene des Fetroles S.A. v. Sensor Nederland
B. V.
Courts of other nations do not consider U.S. foreign policy prin-
ciples when deciding a jurisdictional issue. In addition, other na-
tions accept the effects doctrine only in limited circumstances. The
Netherlands District Court at The Hague rejected the effects doc-
trine in Compagnie Europeene des Petroles S.A. v. Sensor Nederland B. V. 175
Sensor Nederland (Sensor), a Dutch company wholly owned by a
U.S. parent company, refused to fulfill a contractual obligation to de-
liver geophones to a French company because the equipment was
ultimately destined for the Soviet Union. Sensor notified its French
contractor that Sensor was unable to fullfill its contract because it
was bound by the requirements of the EAA. The French contractor
then requested the District Court of the Hague to order Sensor to
deliver the disputed goods or face liquidated damages of Dfl. 10,000
per day. Sensor attempted to invoke a defense of force majeure by re-
lying on "exonerating circumstances" under section 74 of the Uni-
form Act Governing the International Sale of Goods.
The court held that the contract was subject to Netherlands law
and that, under general principles of international law, a nation may
not exercise jurisdiction over acts performed outside its borders un-
less permitted by certain exceptions. According to the court, neither
the nationality principle nor the protection principle applied in this
case. The nationality principle did not apply because the U.S. regu-
latory criterion-"owned or controlled" by a U.S. parent company-
173 Id., art. 98(c).
174 Constitution of the Netherlands, art. 7, para. 3.
175 Repinted in INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 66, 73 (1983). For a discussion of the case, see
Leigh, supra note 87, at 636-37.
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was not generally accepted in international law nor under Article
XXIII of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation be-
tween the Netherlands and the United States.1 76
The protection principle did not apply because it only protects
against consequences of acts performed outside the territory of the
regulating country when such acts jeopardize the security or
creditworthiness of that nation. Those interests do not include the
"foreign policy interest that the U.S. seeks to protect."' 177 Most im-
portantly, the court failed to see "how the export to Russia of goods
not originating in the United States by a non-American exporter
could have any direct and illicit effects within the United States."' 178
Therefore, "the jurisdiction rule cannot be brought into compatibil-
ity with international law."1 79
2. Grandia Project Service
Grandia Project Service"18 illustrates the lucrative business of
smuggling advanced information technology to the East. In Decem-
ber 1988, U.S. and Italian authorities arrested two Dutchmen and a
Belgian and intercepted a Digital Equipment Corporation VAX 8800
computer, a highly advanced J-937 memory test system, and an M-
218 Laser reperation system.' 8 ' The smugglers used as cover a com-
pany called Grandia Project Service which was headquartered in Am-
sterdam with a daughter company in Vienna. The smugglers used
several other front and real companies to transfer the computers
from the United States to Bulgaria or from Belgium to the U.S.S.R.
Grandia is a clear criminal case and is very different from Dresser or
Sensor. The legal principles are straightforward: the Dutchmen were
properly arrested by the United States on U.S. territory for commit-
ting a criminal offense. The only questionable issue is whether the
United States will extradite the smugglers to the Netherlands if they
are convicted in the United States.
3. Kongsberg Vaapenfabrik/Toshiba
From 1982 to 1983, Toshiba, a subsidiary of a Japanese firm,
sold precision machining technology to the Soviet Union. A Norwe-
gian state-owned company, Kongsberg Vaapenfabrik (KV), supplied
176 Article XXIII provides that "companies constituted under the applicable laws and
regulations within the territories of either party shall be deemed companies thereof and
shall have their juridical status recognized within the territories of the other Party."
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Dec. 5, 1957, 8 U.S.T. 2043, T.I.A.S.
No. 3942.
177 22 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS at 72. See also Leigh, supra note 87, at 636.
178 22 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS at 73.
179 Id.
180 In re Goris Christiaan Grandia, R. Grandia Project Service B.V., and Grandia Pro-
ject Services GmbH, 50 Fed. Reg. 7945 (1985) (Case No. 662).
181 Id.
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the software to run the equipment. It is believed this software
helped the Soviet Union produce ship propellers that are substan-
tially quieter than current Soviet propellers thereby making Soviet
submarines harder to detect. The exported technology was on
CoCom's list but probably was not contained in Japan's or Norway's
national regulations. Disturbed by this export, the U.S. Senate
passed a resolution banning imports from KV and Toshiba for two to
five years.' 8 2 This action had immediate economic consequences for
Norway as KV lost a large order from the U.S. Navy leaving U.S.
national suppliers to fill the gap.
Europeans felt that the U.S. action was a hypocritical attempt to
take business from foreign suppliers and give it to U.S. suppliers. In
Oslo it was noted that the strongest advocates of banning KV im-
ports were congressmen from states where competitors of KV were
located. Norway tried to reconcile the problem but did not succeed,
leaving it bitterly disappointed. Toshiba, on the other hand, was
barred from only U.S. Government contracts because a total ban
would have affected too many U.S. companies which were dependent
upon Toshiba products. The technology sent to the Soviets con-
tained no U.S. components but only technology derived from U.S.
sources.
IX. Conclusion
The foregoing cases as well as the political conflicts in the 1980s
point out the major problems that affect CoCom. If CoCom is to
function effectively, its members must resolve some of these substan-
tial problems. First, the inconsistency between economic and secur-
ity interests must be resolved. One way to alleviate this problem is to
update the CoCom IL more often. One quarter of the CoCom IL is
supposed to be updated each year, but in practice the list has become
rapidly outdated. 8 3 For example, home computers with 64 K-bytes
of RAM, hardly products of strategic importance, were still on the
Netherlands list in 1987.184
Second, members must harmonize implementation of CoCom
rules in the different legal systems of each member. The granting of
export licenses varies greatly between CoCom members. For exam-
ple, the likelihood of obtaining an export license under the Nether-
lands Export Decree on Strategic Goods of 1963185 and under the
EAA may vary substantially. In addition, some goods are considered
382 Exec. Order No. 12,661; 54 Fed. Reg. 4780 (1989).
183 See D. BUCHANAN, WESTERN SECURITY AND ECONOMIC STRATEGY TOWARDS THE EAST
25 (1984).
184 Export permits for home computers are easier to obtain than those for complete
network applications.
185 Uitvoerbesluit Strategische Goederen 1963, Stb. 128 (based on the Im-en Ex-
portwet 1962, Stb. 295).
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to be of strategic value in certain situations even though in daily use
they have none.' 8 6 This ambivalence creates uneven economic com-
petition between CoCom members and can lead to a "lowest com-
mon denominator" kind of national security. Thus, not only must
CoCom's list be updated, but it must be harmonized within each
member's legal system.
Third, members must agree to some rules limiting unilateral
acts which have an extraterritorial effect. Currently, unilateral extra-
territorial actions are simply dividing CoCom members. Although
these actions provide short-term security, they weaken the entire
structure in the long term. These actions must be banned, and a
consensus must be reached on limits on the extraterritorial applica-
tion of national laws. Some CoCom members distrust the security
motivation behind other members' export regulations and believe
such regulations are simply intended to frustrate opposing economic
interests. If members agreed to certain common policies and goals,
then they would not intrude into the domestic affairs of other mem-
bers because all members would have voluntarily placed this specific
element of their sovereign powers into the hands of the Alliance as a
whole.
Lately there has been a liberalizing trend in CoCom. Reviews
have taken place more frequently to update the lists.I8 7 During the
late 1970s the CoCom IL was applied rather liberally, particularly by
the European NATO partners. However, when the Soviets inter-
vened in Poland and Afghanistan, the United States took a more re-
strictive approach to export control. Whether renewed arms control
along with glasnost and perestroika will cause CoCom to liberalize its
lists further is an open question. The substantial changes in Eastern
Europe create further pressure for liberalization of CoCom con-
186 Technically, any item has potential military usefulness. A commonly cited example
is the use of computer games to train gunners or military pilots. A more realistic example
is an export embargo on certain civil trucks that could be useful in times of war. If this line
of reasoning were taken to its logical extreme, cake could have a positive effect on military
morale and therefore be regulated.
Many in the United States have adhered to the long-standing position that every arti-
cle that could potentially enhance Soviet industrial power should be considered a strategic
good. Western Europe would reserve that term for goods of military importance. Craw-
ford & Lenway, Decision Modes and International Regime Change: Western Collaboration on East-
West Trade, 37 WORLD POLITICS 375, 390 (1985).
The United States does not have a monopoly on restrictive thinking about strategic
trade. "When ... Sweden restricted the import of footwear from the EEC contrary to its
Free Trade Agreement with the Community it justified its action on public security
grounds, claiming that maintaining a viable domestic footwear industry was a military ne-
cessity to ensure the supply of boots for the armed forces in the event of war." Although
Sweden is not a CoCom member, it is interesting to note that "[b]oots are not on the
CoCom list." Hunnings, Legal Aspects of Technology Transfer to Eastern Europe and the Soviet
Union, in TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND EAST-WEST RELATIONS 146, 149 (1985).
187 More than 90,000 items remain on the Control List.
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trols.188 There are possible countervailing forces to this liberalizing
trend. The expected increase in East-West trade may increase U.S.
fear of losing its market share to Western Europe and Japan. The
United States and other NATO members may also see the strength-
ening of export controls as a necessary replacement for the interme-
diate range ballistic missiles traded away by the INF Treaty.
Currently, it is impossible to make a strong prediction. Whatever the
result, CoCom must ultimately set a standard for free export.189
The greatest threat to CoCom's future is the character of infor-
mation and information technology. The growing global informa-
tion and communication network has diffused technology and
information. Technology in non-CoCom states will continue to in-
crease creating further confusion and mistrust among CoCom na-
tions over how to apply restrictive export rules. The only solution is
a liberalization of CoCom rules to a level which is acceptable to all
CoCom countries and, to some extent, to the rest of the world. Un-
fortunately, this solution is essentially impossible and the effective-
ness of export control regulations will continue to erode.
188 Timmerman, It's Too Early to Relax Technology Curbs for East Bloc, Wall St.J., Nov. 20,
1989, at A19, col. 3. ("The reformers within the Warsaw Pact don't need the type of tech-
nology COCOM controls; only the Warsaw Pact military has such needs.").
189 This standard could either be the state-of-the-art in the Soviet Union or that in the
West.
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